vVe usc a cake-eating model with a non-rerw'i;vable resource and a backstop technology to describe the effect of IIligration of poor workers into a rich country \\ith surplus labor. I\!Iigrants receive a large transfer from natives. If future migration is <-lnticipated 1 natives) flow of utility increases discontinuously at the time of migration. 1\ifig,ration at time 0 may cause the~initial flow of nativesũ tility to be higher. However, the present discounted value of the streaIn of per capita utility falls. Thus, when migra:tion occurs, it rnay benefit the current genenltion of natives, ,jlthough it harms other generations.
Introduction
The late 20'th century has seen several episodes of large population movements from poor to rich regions. There have also been several Cfhses of the integration of labor markets in countries with different levels of development. Although migration and the integration of labor markets have many distinctive features, they have in eommon that relatively poor workers join a richer population. This feature has led to seriOlIB political debates within the richer/host country, particularly when migrants receive transfers from their hosts.
\lVe study the effects, on the per capita utility in the host country, of a combined exogenous increase in population and a transfer to the neweomers. For brevity we refer to the additional workers as migrants, although we can also think of them as being the workers in the poor integration partner. In our model, migration (combined with the transfer) reduces the steady state level and the present discounted stream of natives' welfare. In that sense, the model confirms the view that migration harms natives. However, migration is likely to beuefit the generation alive at the time that it occurs. This result is counter-intuitive, since it might seem that the generation alive when migration occurs would bcar the brunt of the change.
Important examples of migrations include the flows from North Africa and the Mideast into Europe, and frorn Latin Arnerica into North America. IvIigration sornetirnes causes an abrupt increase in the labor pool. For ,,-'Cample, in 1962 nearly a million French eolonists mtmned from Algeria, increasing the French labor force by 2 perccnt (Hunt [1, "] ). In the mid 7 percent (Carrington and de Lima [8] ). The 1980 Cuban exodus from the port of Mm'iel increased Miami's labor force by 7 percent (Card ). In 80rn8 cases one country absorbs the population of another, even though the amonnt of physical movement of labor is smalL
The German unification is the most extreme reeent example of this kind of integration. The adlmsion of South European countries to the European Union were similar but less extreme events.
\,ye assume that all agents have the same productivity, and that migrmlts are endowed only with labor-power. These simplifying assumptions m'e not essential, but they enable us to analyze the interternporal effects of rnigration 1 . \\le also assurne that prior to rnigratioIl, the horne country has an excess supply of labor, in a sense whicb we make precise below.
Thus, migrants bring a factor of production which is in exceBS supply.
The equilibrium we study is determined by a social planner who maximizes the pre..c;ent discounted stream of the sum of per capita utilities, including the utility of migrants. Equivalently, the equilibrium is determined by a competitive market, and migrants receive an equal share of society's total capitaL Since this assumption is important to our results, and is not literally true, it requires discussion.
In some casm migrants receive a portion of social capital in the form of transf(~rs. For example, the French colonists returning from Algeria were entitled to the same social benefits as other French citizens. The integration of East and \Vest Germany, and the adhesion of Reg,mlless of thc actual size of the transfers, there is widespread popular belief that they have been and will continue to be large. In campaigning for re-election, Chancellor Kohl vowed that integration would not require higher t","'l:es. This promise reflected the fear that integration would require large tnmsfers, whieh would lower welfme in yVest Germany. Similady, the (pereeived) need to make large transfers has been one impediment to enlargement of the European Union. In some cases the actual transfer may be small or even negative, but the native population believes it is large. In California, the popular belief that immigration has resulted in a large drain on the public purse fueled State Proposition 187, which sought to eliminat.e this transfer for illegal immigrants" . Thus, our assumpt.ion t.hat. migraJlt.s receive an equal share of social capit.al exaggerat.es what. in some cases is true, and in many cases is belifwed.
If there are no transfers, t.hen the assumpt.ion of a social planner who redistribut.es wealth overstat.es t.he economic: cost of migrat.ion borne by the existing population. Our model caJl then be viewed as a worst-case scenario (from the perspective of nat.ives). Even in this case, rnigration has surprising effects.
2 A study by Huddk~[13] estimates that the net sodal cost of immigrants (the value of transfers and immigrants' consumption of public services minus their tax payments) WfL'S $65 billion in 1996, Fix and Passel [12] However, migration has surprising effects on the intertemporaJ distribution of utility.
Migration might increase the per capita flow of utility of the generation alive at the time it occurs, even though it certainly decreases the present value of the future stream of per capita utility. If future migration is anticipated, then there is a jump in per capita utility at the time migration occurs.
Our results are relevant for the political economy of migration, since they imply that the current gEmeration might be too willing (from the standpoint of future generations) to admit migrants. Also, if a certain level of migration is inevitable, the current generation prefers that it happen sooner rather than later. On a more abstract level··· or for readers who dispute the plausibility of our basic assumptions our analysis contributes to the understanding of c11ke-eating models. 
The model
\Ve first describe the technology, and then the economic objective.
The technology
The economy consists of N identical agents who obtain utility from consumption of a ho- per capita leisure is I(t) = 1 Extraction require.s less labor to create a unit of the consumption good, relative to production, so II < 'I. vVe ean think of the consumption good as representing "embodied energy", which can be produced either from exhaustible natmal resources (e.g. oil) or by using an unlimited rmource such as sunlight together with a fixed stock of capital. It is cheaper to obtain energy using oil rather thml sunlight.
The stock of the nonrenewable resource is eventually exhausted, but while a positive amount remains, the flow of extraction is unbounded. However, the flow of production is bounded at every point in time since it requires capital, which is in fixed supply. At a point in time society's ability to extraet oil is for all practical purposes unbounded, but it's ability to use solm power is constrained by limited capital.
The economic problem Per capita utility is U = U(e(t),

Utility is increasing and
COnG.lve in consHrnption and leisure) with U d 2 O. Consu111ption and 1ei8111'(; are "essential goods)): their Illarginal utilities beeorne infinite at levels near O. 6 \eVe assume that the initial resource stock Y (0) and the capital stock x axe small enough that the constraint 1;(t) <; oj' is binding on the entire optimal trajectory. This assumption mcans that t.he economy would be willing t.o sac:rifice leisure to obtain more of t.he consurnption good, but is eonstraincxi froIn doing so because it cannot inerea,se production, and can increase current. extraction only at the cost. of reducing fut.ure extraction. Labor is not a constraining fact.or; in t.his sense, labor is in excess supply. Define o(t) as the shadow value of the constraint x(t;) <; x (i.e., the rental rate of capital on the opt.imal trajectory):
u,:IJUt =o(t), where a "*" indicates optimality. \eVe restate the assumption as
Given that t.he initial resource stock is finit.e, there will be a finite time T at which it is exhausted. Thereafter the economy relies exclusively on product.ion. In view of Assumption 1, x is the optimal level of production after T. For a discount rate of r, the present discount.ed value of social welfare at T is where (the endogenolls constant) ,\ is the shadow value at time 0 of the resource stock.
3 An anticipated future increase in population (1) ( 2) vVe begin by showing that au increase in population lowers both the present discounted future stream of per capita utility and the steady state per capita utility, An additional worker obtains an equal share of society's wealth and contributes his labor power. Since labor is not the constraining factor of production, natives (the inframarginal agents) lose more than they gain. This result sets the stage for a discussion of the intert.emporal flow effects of a population increase.
The present discounted value of social welfare is J (Y; N) , and the present. discounted value of the stream of per capita utilit.y is . In the appendix we c'stablish It is also obvious that the steady state per capita utility,
Although the model contains no surprises with respect to either the steady state level of, or the value of the stream of per capita utility, the effects on utility at a point in time are unexpected. Here we consider the situation where the social planner knows at time 0 that there will be a discrete increase in population at an exogenous time T > O.
vVe show that the How of per capita utility increases discontinuously at t = T. This result improves our intuition about the cake-eating problem and also leads to a conjecture that we verify in a simpler setting.
vVe refer to the situation where N is constant as the "reference case". Since the future population change rednces the value of the stream of welfare, and since the social planner wants to smooth utility, he adjnsts the program so that generations over [0, T) hear some of the cost. This adjustment delays extraction, relative to the reference case. This delay requires an increase in the shadow value ofthe resource and a corresponding decrease in y(t)"
. Over [0, T) the only change, relative to the reference case, is that the extradion profile shifts down. Consequently, the flow of utility over 6 The proof of Proposition 1 shows formally that
is h:ss than in the refercnce C'Lse.
Continuity of A at T and equation (2) Here we sketch a geomet.ric proof for Proposition 2, using Figure 1' ) . This figure shows t.he extraction levels that would maintain continuity in per capita consumption (the graph ) and the extraction levels that would maintain continuity in per capita leisure (the graph 1+ = ). The shaded area shows the extradion levels for which c+ 2: and 1+ 2:
7 If marginal utility were discontinuous at T it would be pos-sible to reallocate extraction between and T+ in SUdl a way as to increase per eapita utility K The increase in population, D., can be large. However, we assume that it is not so large that it causes a regime eharlgc. Specifically, the eonstraint !J :? 0 is not binding over extnlction remains positive over this intervaL See Favard [111 for details. 9 In this sketch (unlike in the formal \VC~assume that [/ is strictly concave in c and l. Th(:refore the \-veak inequalities in the proposition arc replaced by strict inequalities. Allowing weak concavity complicates the exposition. an increase in the asset price, .\. Since this assct price aJlticipates the increase in population at time r, it must be continuous at T. However, the population increases discontinuously at T. Thus, at T society has more workers than it had a moment before, but faces the same price of the resource. Since extraction requires less labor than production (J1 < ''I), natives shift some of their labor from production into extraction. They consume more than before T, while working less" . Figure   10 1\'10r8 preeiselYj neither decreases and at lea"st one increases. If [I is strictly concave in both C <11H1 I) then both strictly increase. 11 . If f/ > '7 Proposition 1 is reversed: there is a discontinuous drop in per capita consumption, kisure and utility at T. \Ve do not consider this eEtSf,: because it sef:InS empirically less interesting. 2a illustrates the case where this jump is large enough that per capita utility is higher than in the reference case (during an interval after 1")~~a possibility we have not yet confirmed. 
A population increase at the initial time
Proposition 2 led to the conjecture that the generation alive at the time of an exogenous population increase may benefit. from the change. Here we confirm that possibility by considering an increase in population at the initial time: 1" = O. Wnen 1" > 0, generations prior to 1" bear some of the cost.s of the population increase, and bequeath a larger resonrce stock to generation 1" (relative to the reference case). This larger stock makes it more likely that per capita utility at 1" is higher than in the reference case. vvnen 1" = 0 it is obviously not possible to shift the cost to previous generations. The special case 1" = 0 therefore provides a challenging test for our conjecture, because it eliminates one mechanism that tends to make ntility higher at the time of the population increase.
Regardless of when the population increases (1" = 0 or 1" > 0) t.he shadow value of the resource, .A j Hlllst increase~This incre(1.se tends to reduce e. . . xtraction, EtHd therefore to reduce the current flow of welfare. vVhen r > 0, the higher value of .\ indueed by the population increase is not offset by auy other change over [0, so the flow of welfare over that interval unambiguously dccreases (relative to the reference case). vVe saw from Proposition 2 that at time T the higher population provides an offsetting efl(xt: the larger stock of labor causes natives to shift from produetion to extradion, allowing them to increase both consumption and leisure.
vvl18n the population increa.'ieB at T = 0, the two counteracting forces occur at the same time. The population increase eauses .\ to rise, which promote.s a reduetion in extraction and a loss in the flow of utility. However, the increased stock of labor causes each worker to spend relatively more time on extradion. Since extraetion (compared to production) requires leBs labor per unit of consumption, this shift increases leisure, promoting an increase in utility.
Either of these two effects might dominate, so the flow of welfare at time 0 might increase or decrea.'ie.
Define y'(t) := y(t,.\, N) as the optimal extraction policy [the solution to equations (1) and (2)]. We have
Proposition 3 A necessmy and 8njJicient condition for a population increase at time 0 to increase the flow of utility at time t ::c 0 is dy'(t) > x ex(t) -+-y'(t) (:3) dN N . \ · N'
Proof.~1
Rearranging the last inequality implies equation (3) .
•
The left side of equation (3) is a total derivative; it includes the direct effect (on equilibrium extraction) of a change in N as well as the indirect effect, via the change in A. The appendL'< provides the formnla for %. Since this formula involves the entire trajectory of the optimal path, it cannot be easily interpreted. However, for a particular example, it is easy to determine whether equation (3) The generation that precedes the migration subsidizes the generation that follows it. When migration occurs at the initial time, it may increase the initial per capita flow of utility.
Migration increases the resource price and reduces per capita consumption. However, the natives spend relatively more time working in the "extraction activity", and less time in the "production activity". If the resulting increase in the leisure more than offsets the lower consumption, their utility rises. Using a numerical example, we showed that this case can certainly occur.
A popular view of migration holds that even if it has long run benefits, it imposes short run costs on the current generation of nativc:s 1 which needs to make transfers to the rnigrants. 16 Owing to the particular assumptions of our model, migration never has long run benefits, either in the steady state or with respect to the present value of the stream of per capita utility. However, contrary to the popular view, migration might beuefit the generation alive at the time it occurs. This conclusion has two political economy implications. The first is that the current generation might be too willing to accept migrants, from the perspective of national welfare.
This might happen if migrants benefit the current generation of natives, but harm the stream of future generations 14 The second implication is that if migration is bound to occur, it is in the interests of the current generation that it occur sooner rather than later. These implications are interesting because they run counter to conventional \visdom.
As we emph'L'3ized in the Introduction, this model has a built-in bias against migration, since it views migrants as bringing only their appetites and labor power to a labot surplus economy; it ignores their other contributions to society. It is worth repeating that the antimigrant implication (Propositiou 1) is an obvious artifact of our restrictive assumptions, and is therefore not particularly useful. On the other hand, we think that the greater underst,mding of the intertemporal effects of migTation (summarized in Propositions 2 and 3) is useful. 14 The ernpiricalliterature [17] ) stresses the: opposite possibility: there aTE; short run cost of educating migrants~children, and long nm benefits as these children become productive. Our theoretical model does not address and therefore does not contradict this possibility. Instead, we focus on a less obvious mechanism through \vhieh migration has different short and long nm effeds.
Appendix
The appendix consists of three parts: proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 1, details for the example in Section 4, and a discussion of the more general model ,,~th endogenous capitaL
The proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) We write the solution to equations (1) and (2) as the function y(t, A, N), Taking partial derivatives of equation (2) implies
We take the differential of equation (1), using the optimality condition y(T, A, N) = 0, to
hich implies
vVe \nite the dynamie programming equation for the social planner's problem and divide
The function J(~~N) is the present discounted value of the per capita utility of a single agent, when the size of the population is N. Differentiating both sides by N, using the envelope theorem, impli,os
where we define /\ = ly(Y; N), and ;,~= lY,N. Using equation (2), we rewrite this equality
The last inequality follows from equation (7) Now consider the case where the planner anticipates that migration will occur at 7.
Dividing this planner's objective by the constant N, we obtain an equivalent objective (i.e., one that leads to the same optimal extraction trajectory):
Denote the solution to the problem in (9) 
(c"I,)ds +
The inequality in (10) follows from the fact that the triple c;*, 1;*, Y;* is the solution to (9).
This triple does not maximize expression in brackets in (10) , since the denominator of the second term of the maximand is N + 6 rather than N [as in equation (9)].
Equations (8) and (10) imply
i.e., the present discounted value of per capita utility in the absence of migTation is higher
Hum the present discounted value of the per capita utility of natives when the populatiou ) .
Proof. \Ve again use the function y(t, A, Nt), the solution to equation (2), where Nt = N + I(t).6.. We simplify notation by ,vriting Nt as N. We rewrite the partial derivative i' * given in equation (6) as 
At time t = 7, t and A are fixed, but N changes, so we can write
Using equation (12) we have
where we abbreviate y(t, A, N) as y(N). Since theAse two inequalities cannot both hold as equalities, either consumption or leisure must be strictly higher at . Since utility is increasing in both its arguments, we obtain the third inequality in the Proposition.
• 22
The Example
Derivation of . We substitute equations (5) and (11) 
The total eflect of a marginal change in population on the instantaneous extraction rule is
We can use equations (5), (11) and (7) to simplify equation (16) . (16) Simplifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for a welfare increase. Using equations (5), (ll), (7) and (16), we can rewrite (3) as
The equation for T. In order to evaluate condition (17) we need the equation for ' } = 1, x = T = /1 = 0.5. In order for equation (18) to have a positive solution, and
T(A, N). Optimality requires that y(T,
for Assumption 1 to be satisfied, we require that /3 E (1.71,2). The following table presents the endogenous values of several variables (at t = 0) for different values of /3.
A larger value of /3 requires a higher initial stock, in order to maintain A = 1. The time to exhaustion, T, is correspondingly higher, and the rental rate on capital, it, is lower.
Endogenous capital
Here we hriefly cor1sider the case where capital is endogenous. \Ve do not attempt to show formally that Propositions 1 -3 hold in this more general setting, but we explain why the intuition behind those propositions remains valid.
Suppose that society can increase the stock of capital, X. As in the text, we suppose that production of one unit of the consumption good requires one unit of capital and TI units of labor: the flow of production is :r (t) when society uses x(t) units of capital and TIX(t) units of labor. As before, we have the constraint which is implied by the finite stock of capital and the Leontieff production function:
The increase in the stock of capital equals investment, which is proportional to production plus extraction minus consumption (capital does not depreciate) The endogeneity of capital provides an additional method of smoothing consumption.
The per capita cost of a higher population is therefore smaller (relative to the G1Be of fixed capital) but is still positive. vVhen migration occurs at T > 0, the shadow value of the resource rises and consumption over [0, T) falls as before. Howevcr, since it is possible to convert extraction to capital, leisure does not necessarily rise (or does not rise by as much aB in the case with fixed capital). Utility over [0, T) still falls (relative to the reference case).
In the simplest case, inequality (21) is binding after the jump at T. In this caBe, the intuition for Proposition 2 still holds. When (19) and (21) vVhen the population increases at time°agents reallocate labor time from production to extraction, so their leisure tends to increase. However, the possibility of investing increa.ses the incentive to defer consmnption. The investment opportunity also makes leisure lCBS attra.ctive. Thus, we conjecture that if it is eibSY to convert the consumption good to capital (i.e. if p is large) the iucrease in population at time°is less likely to increase the flow of utility at. t.ime 0.
